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Sophistic Criticisms of the Rule 




The paper discusses different interpretations of Callicles and Thrasymachus’ posi-
tions. There are good reasons for interpreting Callicles as a critic of democracy and 
as an aristocratic political thinker whose political views are closer to Plato’s than is 
usually assumed. The paper argues that Callicles defends a natural right of the best 
citizens to rule over the crowd. However, in contrast to Plato, for Callicles the rule 
of the best should not aim at the common good but at their personal advantage. 
The paper also discusses the view that Thrasymachus is just a sociologist of power 
who diagnoses what actually happens in politics (Henning Ottmann, Max Salomon). 
This interpretation is still current, and enables us to understand important aspects 
of legislation in contemporary democracies. Finally, the paper argues that there are 
reasons to understand Thrasymachus not only as a political realist, but, similar to 
Protagoras, as a moral sceptic.
1. Plato’s and Aristotle’s appreciation of the rule of law
Today the rule of law is usually recognized as a central political ideal or prin-
ciple of governance. According to it, all citizens and in particular the state 
authority and government are subject to the law and held accountable by it. 
Nobody is above the law. The effective enforcement of the rule of law requires 
the separation of powers and in particular an independent judiciary. Further 
constraints are that everyone is equal before the law and that the law needs 
to be publicly promulgated. The rule of law aims at both preventing the abuse 
of power and safeguarding the public good and the freedom of the citizens.1
1 In his important book on the history, politics, and theory surrounding the rule of law, Tamanaha 
conceives of the rule of law as “an exceedingly elusive notion” which is understood in several 
contrasting ways; B. Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law. History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge 2004, 
p. 3. In his book, Tamanaha isolates three “themes of clusters of meaning” that “run through 
the rule of law tradition”: 1) “the sovereign, and the state and its officials, are limited by the 
law”; 2) formal legality, i.e. “public, prospective laws, with the qualities of generality, equality 
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 In the archaic period of ancient Greece, equality before the “law” (nomos) 
was already established as a principle.2 However, the law was usually used in 
favor of the interests of the aristocrats, which constituted an injustice that 
outraged the farmers. The demand for a truly equal application of the law 
was an important part of the democratic idea.3 In Herodotus’ constitutional 
debate, Otanes links a “multitude’s rule” to “equality before the law” (isono-
mia) (Herodotus, Hist. III,80, transl. A. D. Godley). In 462/461 B. C., prepared 
by the reforms of Cleisthenes (508/507 B. C.), democracy was established in 
Athens and in the following period “popular sovereignty reached its peak”.4 
In Athenian democracy, the law was no longer seen as an unchangeable pat-
tern established by the gods, but as “the instrument in which the people of 
Athens asserted their sovereignty over their own legal and political affairs”.5 
Nevertheless, the enacted law could not be modified easily by legislative as-
semblies or popular courts and the rule of law, which included equality be-
fore the law and accountability of magistrates, was respected as an essential 
part of democracy.6
 In his important study on Athenian democracy, Martin Ostwald exam-
ines the “challenges popular sovereignty had to face” throughout the fifth 
century.7 As a result of these challenges, when democracy was restored in 
Athens at the end of the fifth century, “the principle of the sovereignty of 
law was given official primacy over the principle of popular sovereignty”.8 
Sovereignty of law complements the rule of law and means that a written 
law code is enacted by “lawgivers” (nomothetai) and that no decree by ei-
ther the Popular Assembly or the Council had higher authority than a law.9 
of application, and certainty. … Formal legality emphasizes a rule-bound order established and 
maintained by government”; 3) the rule of law is contrasted to the rule of man; ibid., pp. 114, 
119, 122.
2 J. Bleicken, Die athenische Demokratie, Paderborn 19942, p. 289.
3 Ibid.
4 Ch. Meier, Athen. Ein Neubeginn der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1993, p. 351; M. Ostwald, From Popu-
lar Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law. Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens, Berkeley 
1987, p. xx.
5 M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law, pp. 129–130; 
6 J. W. Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, Oxford 1956, pp. 69–70; democracy “was 
synonymous for the Athenians with the ’rule of law’”; ibid., p. 90; cf. B. Z. Tamanaha, On the 
Rule of Law, pp. 7–8.
7 M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law, xix.
8 Ibid., pp. xx, 497, 524.
9 Ibid., pp. 500 ff., 523. It is interesting to notice that Ostwald nowhere in his book uses the term 
“rule of law” and it is not clear whether for him “rule of law” is identical with “sovereignty 
of law”. However, the distinction between the two terms makes sense. “Sovereignty of law” 
complements the “rule of law” but further expresses that only in cases of clearly proven in-
adequacy can existing laws be changed. Compared to regular rule of law, sovereignty of law 
aims at preventing the people from declaring and changing the law as they please and thus at 
thwarting the dangers entailed in popular sovereignty.
A consistent and stable “new kind of democracy” was established in which 
“jury courts held center stage”, while in “matters of legislation the Assembly 
relinquished its final say to nomothetai”.10 The conception of sovereignty of 
law, which comprises the rule of law and aims at thwarting the dangers en-
tailed in popular sovereignty, inspired Plato who advocates it in the Laws as 
the essential and primary principle of governance:
Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, 
the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is master of 
the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full 
of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state 
(Plato, Leg. IV,715d; transl. T. J. Saunders).11
In the Laws, Plato develops a mixed constitution in which the ruling citizens 
are subject to the laws.12 He even sets up a special court that examines the 
conduct of the holders of the political offices (Leg. XII,945b ff.; cf. Polit. 298e–
299a). In doing this, he establishes a whole system of “checks and balances” 
and anticipates some of the basic principles of modern political systems.13 
However, Plato’s version of the sovereignty and rule of law has to be clearly 
distinguished from its modern and contemporary counterpart, which it 
partly anticipates.14 For Plato, the institution of laws that aim at the common 
good of the whole city is a crucial precondition for a flourishing political 
community (Leg. IV,715b; cf. IX,875a).
 Aristotle agrees with Plato’s appreciation of the sovereignty and rule of 
law and distinguishes right and wrong constitutions according to the cri-
terion of whether the rulers and their laws aim at the common good or 
rather at their personal advantage (Pol. III,6,1279a17–21, 11,1282b8–13; 
10 Ibid., p. xi, 524; cf. B. Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, p. 8.
11 Plato anticipates this appreciation of the sovereignty of law in the Politikos, in which he distin-
guishes three right constitutions from three wrong ones by means of the criterion of whether 
the rulers govern according to the law or against it (Polit. 302d–e). The fact that Plato chooses 
a lawful government as the essential criterion for evaluating existing constitutions demon-
strates the important role that the rule of law begins to occupy in his later political philosophy. 
However, as early as in the Republic Plato talks frequently about the laws of the city and – an-
ticipating a central idea of the Laws – says that the “guardians of the laws” should not change 
the most important laws of the city (Resp. IV,421a, 445e; VI,484b, 504c).
12 M. Knoll, Platons Konzeption der Mischverfassung in den Nomoi und ihr aristokratischer Charak-
ter, in: M. Knoll – F. L. Lisi (eds.), Platons “Nomoi”. Die politische Herrschaft von Vernunft und 
Gesetz (Staatsverständnisse, 100), Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 23–48.
13 Cf. R. F. Stalley, An Introduction to Plato’s Laws, Oxford 1983, pp. 115–116.
14 A main difference between the two versions of the rule of law is that, for Plato, reasonable laws 
are an expression of divine reason. Cf. F. L. Lisi, Plato and the Rule of Law, in: Methexis, 26, 2013, 
pp. 83–102. Lisi argues mainly against G. Morrow’s influential article titled Plato and the Rule of 
Law, in: The Philosophical Review, 50, 1941, pp. 105–126.
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IV,1,1289a10–22). Like Plato in the Laws, he states that the sovereignty and 
rule of law is more desirable than the rule of individual citizens and that in-
dividual rulers “must be established as law-guardians and as servants of the 
laws” (Pol. III,16,1287a21–22, transl. C. Lord; cf. Leg. IV,715c). Aristotle calls the 
law an „intellect without appetite“ (aneu orexeôs nous) (Pol. III,16,1287a33, 
transl. C. Lord).15 This wording elucidates why for Aristotle and the later Plato 
the sovereignty and rule of law is superior to the rule of persons who display 
moral and intellectual excellence. Even such persons are subjected to their 
appetites and passions, inclinations and disinclinations, and to pleasure and 
pain. Because of these tendencies and because of avarice and selfishness they 
are constantly at risk of making arbitrary and unjust decisions and of treat-
ing equal cases unequally (Leg. IV,713c; IX,875b–d; cf. V,739a–e). In contrast, 
laws are devoid of such tendencies and therefore represent, if they are good 
and reasonable, an assurance for justice and the flourishing of the political 
community.
 Of course, not all ancient Greek political thinkers were in agreement with 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s appreciation of the sovereignty and rule of law. In 
particular Callicles and Thrasymachus, both portrayed by Plato as sophists, 
advanced substantial criticisms of these principles in the late fifth century. 
Today, Callicles and Thrasymachus are among the well-known proponents 
of sophistic views because of their appearances in Plato’s Gorgias and Re-
public. However, in the literature it is disputed whether they are merely fic-
tional characters or actual historical persons. It is likely but not certain that 
Plato’s Thrasymachus is identical with the eponymous orator and teacher of 
rhetoric from Chalkedon (today a part of Istanbul called Kadıköy).16 Several 
scholars claim that Callicles is just a fictional character (“eine Kunstfigur 
15 However, the concept of “reason” (nous) on which Aristotle’s statement is based is very differ-
ent from Plato’s. While for Plato reasonable laws are an expression of divine reason, for Aristo-
tle good laws are the expression of human “prudence” (phronêsis). For Aristotle’s concept of 
“prudence” see R. Elm, Klugheit und Erfahrung bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1996.
16 Guthrie and Untersteiner identify Plato’s Thrasymachus with the orator from Chalkedon and 
try to square their views; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, Cambridge 1977, 
ch. “The Sophists”, pp. 88–97, 294–298; M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti (Presentazione di Fernanda 
Decleva Caizzi), Milano 1949, pp. 497–501 (engl.: The Sophists, Oxford 1954). At the beginning of 
his article, Kerferd identifies the two as well, making a reference to E. Schwarz, De Thrasymacho 
Chalcedonio (Index scholarum in academia Commentatio Rostochiensi), Rostock 1892, pp. 3–16; 
G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, in: Durham University Journal, 9, 
1947, pp. 19–27; again in: C. J. Classen (ed.), Sophistik (Wege der Forschung, CLXXXVII), Darm-
stadt 1976, pp. 545–563. In contrast, Maguire distinguishes between Plato’s Thrasymachus 
and the orator from Chalkedon. In Resp. I, Maguire makes out three different assertions about 
“the just” and attempts to decide which of these need to be assigned to which Thrasymachus; 
J. P. Maguire, Thrasymachos – – – or Plato?, in: Phronesis, 16, 1971, pp. 142–163; again in: C. J. Clas-
sen (ed.), Sophistik, pp. 564–588.
Platons”17). However, others such as George B. Kerferd and Hellmut Flashar 
stated in 1998 that a majority of scholars today are inclined to acknowledge 
him as a historical person.18
 This article analyses and compares Callicles’ and Thrasymachus’ criti-
cisms of the rule of law. Their criticisms of the validity of nomos (law, moral-
ity, custom) are similar in some ways and both seem to be informed by the 
historian Herodotus that nomos varies from one culture to another. Based 
on this information, the sophist Protagoras defended the view that in moral 
and legal matters there are no universal truths.19 One important parallel be-
tween Callicles and Thrasymachus is that both relate the nomos to questions 
of power and benefit. Both analyze its origin and the interests it serves. It is 
not easy to come up with indisputable interpretations of Thrasymachus’ and 
Callicles’ legal, political, and ethical views. Our only source for Callicles is 
Plato’s Gorgias. The surviving fragment from Thrasymachus of Chalkedon on 
justice is not easy to reconcile with the position Plato’s Thrasymachus holds 
on the subject.20 In the literature, Thrasymachus’ and Callicles’ views are 
a controversial issue. In particular with respect to the interpretation of Thra-
symachus’ position, many proposals have been advanced. George B. Kerferd, 
who discusses several of them, distinguishes between “ethical nihilism” (no 
real moral obligation exists), “legalism” (all moral obligation stems from le-
gal enactment), “natural law theory” (moral obligation exists and arises from 
the nature of man), and “psychological egoism” (humans by nature act in 
their presumed self-interest).21
 The following interpretation of Callicles’ and Thrasymachus’ criticisms 
of the rule of law starts out with an analysis of their views of a good and 
happy life (sections 2 and 3). Both defend similar views of human nature and 
a good life. Callicles defends a radical form of hedonism and of psychologi-
17 H. Ottmann, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Die Griechen, Stuttgart 2001, 1/1, p. 225; 1/2, 
p. 15.
18 G. B. Kerferd – H. Flashar, Die Sophistik, in: H. Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophie der Antike, 2/1: So-
phistik. Sokrates. Sokratik. Mathematik. Medizin (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, eds. 
K. Döring – H. Flashar – G. B. Kerferd – C. Oser-Grote – H.-J. Waschkies), Basel 1998, p. 85; cf. 
E. R. Dodds (ed.), Plato: Gorgias, Oxford 1959, pp. 12–13. Following Dodds, Balot believes “that 
Callicles was a real person in the late fifth century who held views similar to those attributed to 
him in the Gorgias”; R. K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, Princeton 2001, p. 5.
19 Most of our knowledge of Protagoras is derived from Plato’s dialogues Theaetetus and Protag-
oras; see Tht. 172b, 177d.
20 Thrasymachus of Chalkedon refers to justice as the “greatest of human goods” and laments 
that humans “make no use of it” and that the gods don’t take notice of this (DK 85 B 8, transl. 
M. K.). 
21 G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. For another overview of differ-
ent interpretations of Thrasymachus’ views see R. C. Cross – A. D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic. 
A Philosophical Commentary, London 1964, pp. 28–41. Cross and Woozly distinguish between (1) 
Naturalistic Definition, (2) Nihilist View, (3) Incidental Comment, (4) Essential Analysis. 
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cal and ethical egoism, claiming that a good life consists in an unrestrained 
satisfaction of desires. Thrasymachus holds that the life of an unjust person 
is better than that of a just one, and that the life of a tyrant is best. Callicles’ 
and Thrasymachus’ criticisms of the rule of law are linked to their respec-
tive views of a good and happy life. Understanding the latter improves our 
comprehension of the former. Therefore, their criticisms of the rule of law 
(sections 4 and 5) are only examined after their views of a good and happy 
life (sections 2 and 3). This is the reverse order in which Plato presents their 
respective views. The conclusion advances final interpretations of both their 
positions and the similarities and differences of their political thought. It 
argues that Thrasymachus is not only a legal positivist but a political sociolo-
gist and political realist who holds a coherent view. Furthermore, the conclu-
sion claims that Thrasymachus should be understood, similar to Protagoras, 
as an ethical relativist and a moral skeptic. However, Thrasymachus rejects 
Protagoras’ view that legislation always aims at the good and the advantage 
of the whole political community. This article also argues against the prevail-
ing interpretation according to which Callicles defends a natural right of the 
stronger. Rather, Callicles advocates a natural right of the better and should 
be interpreted as an aristocratic political thinker who criticizes popular sov-
ereignty and democracy (section 4).
2. Callicles’ view of a good and happy life
Callicles lays out his criticism of the rule of law and his view of a good and 
happy life in Plato’s Gorgias. In the text, Socrates first has a debate with the 
famous sophist Gorgias, then with his student Polos, and finally – in the 
dialogue’s climax – with Callicles of the deme Acharnae (Gorg. 495d). In the 
dialogue, Callicles hosts Gorgias in his house in Athens. This is one of several 
reasons for the interpretation that Callicles was a student of Gorgias.22 Cal-
licles’ role as host also implies that he was a well-off man from a privileged 
family or is at least depicted as such by Plato. He clearly has “aristocratic and 
oligarchic connexions” and his aristocratic descent is explicitly mentioned 
(Gorg. 512d).23 However, it seems that Callicles was not a sophist in the strict 
sense because in the Gorgias he dismisses “those who profess to instruct 
people in virtue (aretê)” as worthless (Gorg. 519e–520a; transl. W. Hamilton – 
C. Emlyn-Jones). Rather, Callicles is depicted as an ambitious young man at 
the beginning of his political career (Gorg. 481e, 515a).
22 Irwin claims that Callicles “is a disciple of neither” Gorgias nor Polus; Plato, Gorgias, transl. 
T. Irwin, Oxford 1979, p. 110. 
23 For details see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, p. 102. 
 In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles not only defends his view of a good and happy 
life, but also a theory of natural right, which will be analyzed in section 4. In 
the first phrase of the following central quotation, Callicles refers to natural 
right and its authority:
Callicles: I tell you frankly that what is fine and right by nature (kata phy-
sin kalon kai dikaion) consists in this: that the man who is going to live as 
a man ought should encourage his appetites (epithymia) to be as strong 
as possible instead of repressing them, and be able by means of his cour-
age (andreia) and intelligence (phronêsis) to satisfy them in all their in-
tensity by providing them with whatever they happen to desire. For the 
majority, I believe, this is an impossible ideal; that is why, in an endeav-
our to conceal their own weakness, they blame the minority whom they 
are ashamed of not being able to imitate, and maintain that excess is 
a disgraceful thing. As I said before they try to make slaves of those who 
are better by nature (beltiôn tên physin), and because through their own 
lack of manliness they are unable to satisfy their passions (hedonais), they 
praise moderation (sôphrosynê) and righteousness (dikaiosynê). To those 
who are either the sons of kings to begin with or able by their own quali-
ties to win office or absolute rule or sovereignty (archê tina ê tyrannida ê 
dynasteia), what could in truth be more disgraceful or worse than moder-
ation and justice, which involves their voluntary subjection to the conven-
tions and standards and criticism of the majority, when they might enjoy 
good things without interference from anybody? How can they fail to be 
wretched when they are prevented by your fine righteousness and mod-
eration from favouring their friends at the expense of their enemies, even 
when they are rulers in their own city? The truth, Socrates, which you 
profess to be in search of, is in fact this: luxury (tryphê) and excess (akola-
sia) and licence (eleutheria), provided that they can obtain sufficient back-
ing, are virtue (aretê) and happiness (eudaimonia); all the rest is mere pre-
tence, man-made rules contrary to nature (para physin), worthless cant 
(Plato, Gorg. 491e–492c, transl. W. Hamilton – C. Emlyn-Jones).
This rich and dense passage contains several views. First, in the terminology 
of contemporary ethics, Callicles defends a radical form of psychological and 
ethical egoism. Psychological egoism is a view of human nature which claims 
“that we always do that act that we perceive to be in our own best self-
interest. That is, we have no choice but to be selfish”.24 Ethical egoism “is the 
moral view that everyone ought always to do those acts that will best serve 
24 L. P. Pojman – J. Fieser, Ethics. Discovering Right and Wrong, Belmont (CA) 20127, p. 82.
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his or her own best self-interest. That is, morally right actions are those that 
maximize the best interest of oneself, even when it conflicts with the inter-
ests of others”.25 One common argument for ethical egoism is that it follows 
immediately from psychological egoism.
 Plato’s Callicles combines his psychological and ethical egoism with a de-
fense of a radical form of hedonism. This form likely goes back to Aristippus 
of Kyrene because it defines a good and happy life as the maximization of 
sensual pleasures.26 We arrive at this conclusion because Callicles talks about 
satisfying our “appetites” (epithymia) and identifies “excess” (akolasia) with 
happiness (cf. Gorg. 494a–c). For him, this is natural. And what is natural is 
also good and justified. Today we call this the fallacy of deriving an “ought” 
from an “is”. For Callicles, it is in our best interest to strive for both a maxi-
mum of pleasure and for the material means to attain these pleasures. There-
fore, Callicles’ defense of hedonism is linked to a defense of pleonexia, of the 
desire to have more (pleon = more; echein = to have). According to Callicles’ 
and similar views on human nature, pleonexia mainly aims at goods such as 
wealth, power, and honor or recognition.27 Following Plato’s understanding, 
today the term “pleonexia” is usually given a negative connotation and is 
translated as “avarice” or “greed” (Resp. II,359c; IX,586b; Gorg. 508a; Symp. 
182d, 188b). However, for Callicles pleonexia is not only a natural human 
striving, but nature herself demonstrates “that it is right (dikaion) that the 
better man should have more (pleon echein) than the worse” (Gorg. 483c–d; 
transl. W. Hamilton – C. Emlyn-Jones; cf. section 4 of this article). In his excel-
lent “reconstruction of the Greek discourse on greed”, Ryan K. Balot refers to 
25 Ibid., p. 87.
26 For Aristippus of Kyrene see M. Knoll, Antike griechische Philosophie, Berlin – Boston 2017, 
pp. 185–192, and K. Döring, Der Sokratesschüler Aristipp und die Kyrenaiker (Akademie der Wis-
senschaften und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 
1), Mainz – Stuttgart 1988. For the literature on Callicles’ “notion of happiness” see R. K. Balot, 
Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, p. 6, fn. 16. Following Charles H. Kahn, Balot holds Calli-
cles to be “an indiscriminate hedonist”; ibid., p. 9, fn. 24. 
27 According to Plato’s psychology, the “spirited part of the soul” (thymoeides) is the source of 
the striving for power and recognition and the “appetitive part of the soul” (epithymêtikon) 
is the root of the striving for pleasures and for the material wealth to obtain them (see Resp. 
IV,435c–441c and IX,580d–581c). The greed for having more material possessions, power, and 
recognition than others is identified by several Greek authors, such as Thucydides and Aristotle, 
as a main feature of human nature (Thucydides, Hist. I,22; III,82; V,105). For Aristotle, pleon-
exia is the main motive for unjust actions. This is a central aspect of his proof that particular 
forms of injustice and justice exist that are opposed to the general form of injustice and justice; 
EN V,2–4,1129b1 ff., 1130a15–b6; cf. R. K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, pp. 10, 
22–34, and M. Knoll, Aristokratische oder demokratische Gerechtigkeit? Die politische Philosophie 
des Aristoteles und Martha Nussbaums egalitaristische Rezeption, München – Paderborn 2009, 
pp. 65–68.
Callicles as a “paradigmatic figure” exhibiting “the widest possible range of 
immoral desire to get more”.28
 In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles argues against Socrates who defends the pre-
vailing morality of the Greeks and the paradoxical thesis that it is better to 
suffer injustice than to commit injustice. Callicles rejects the common mo-
rality and in particular two of the classical four cardinal virtues. He rejects 
“moderation” (sôphrosynê) and “justice” (dikaiosynê) because he conceives 
them as obstacles to a good and happy life. However, he praises the two 
other cardinal virtues “courage” (andreia) and “intelligence” (phronêsis). For 
him, these two virtues, and reason in general, are means or instruments for 
attaining pleasure and a good life. It is important to note that in the wake of 
his discussion with Socrates, Callicles defines the elite of the stronger and 
better people, who have a right to rule and to have more than others, mainly 
by the possession of these two virtues (Gorg. 489e, 491a–d; cf. section 4).
 As previously noted in the literature, Callicles’ position is a model for the 
views Nietzsche expresses in his Genealogy of Morality. Callicles claims that 
“moderation” (sôphrosynê) and “justice” (dikaiosynê) are praised by the weak 
who cannot enjoy excessive pleasures and cannot get away with doing in-
justice. With this Callicles gives a genealogy of these virtues that is based 
on psychological assumptions. Like later Nietzsche, Callicles praises “great 
individuals”, shows contempt for the masses, and aims at a revaluation of the 
prevailing egalitarian moral values. We find a similar view about the origin 
of justice at the beginning of Book II of the Republic, where Glaucon presents 
unnamed sophistic views close to those defended by Thrasymachus (Resp. 
II,358e–359b).29 Callicles’ defense of psychological and ethical egoism, a radi-
cal form of hedonism, and pleonexia culminates in a defense of tyranny and 
the life of the tyrant. This is something that he has in common with Thrasy-
machus, who appears in Book I of Plato’s Republic.
3. Thrasymachus’ view of a good and happy life
In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues against the three definitions 
of justice that are proposed consecutively by Kephalos, Polemarchus, and 
Thrasymachus. The position advanced by Thrasymachus is connected to his 
criticism of the rule of law. Before this criticism is analyzed in detail, it is 
28 R. K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, pp. 5, 17, 20.
29 Glaucon introduces these sophistic views by saying that he will “restore Thrasymachus’ argu-
ment“ (Resp. II,358b–c, transl. A. Bloom). For an instructive comparison of Callicles’, Thrasy-
machus’, and Glaucon’s views see M. Vegetti, Antropologie della pleonexia. Callicle, Trasimaco 
e Glaucone in Platone, in: M. Vegetti, Il potere della verità. Saggi platonici, Rome 2018 (20021), 
pp. 195–208.
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beneficial to reconstruct Thrasymachus’ view of a good and happy life, which 
is similar to the one defended by Callicles. Thrasymachus explains his under-
standing of happiness in the context of a criticism of common morality and 
in particular of justice. He argues both that just behaviors are detrimental to 
a good and happy life and that injustice is beneficial for happiness. Therefore, 
he concludes that injustice is superior to justice. Thrasymachus begins sup-
porting these claims with the assertion that
the just man everywhere has less (pantachou elatton echei) than the un-
just man. First, in contracts, when the just man is a partner of the unjust 
man, you will always find that at the dissolution of the partnership the 
just man does not have more than the unjust man, but less. Second, in 
matters pertaining to the city, when there are taxes (eisphorai), the just 
man pays more on the basis of equal property, the unjust man less; and 
when there are distributions, the one makes no profit, the other much. 
And, further, when each holds some ruling office, even if the just man suf-
fers no other penalty, it is his lot to see his domestic affairs deteriorate 
from neglect, while he gets no advantage from the public store, thanks to 
his being just; in addition to this, he incurs the ill will of his relatives and 
his acquaintances when he is unwilling to serve them against what is just 
(Plato, Resp. I,343d–e, transl. A. Bloom).
As this passage and its context demonstrate, Thrasymachus, like Callicles, 
links happiness to pleonexia. While to have less goods is detrimental to 
a good and happy life, to have more is beneficial for it. This shows that Thra-
symachus and Callicles have similar conceptions of a good and happy life. 
Thrasymachus’ main thesis about the relation of happiness to justice and 
injustice reads: “the just man everywhere has less (pantachou elatton echei) 
than the unjust man”. While being unjust is to a person’s private advantage, 
being just is a serious obstacle for attaining happiness. Thrasymachus illus-
trates his main thesis by first referring to voluntary business transactions 
such as contracts and the exchange of goods. In Book V of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle investigates this sphere of justice for which Thomas Aquinas 
coined the term iustitia commutativa. Second, Thrasymachus exemplifies the 
disadvantages of being just in relation to citizens’ contributions and distri-
butions in the polis. In such cases, the unjust citizen will pay less and get 
more goods than the just citizen. Third, Thrasymachus illustrates his central 
thesis by pointing to the disadvantages of being just when holding a political 
office. The just citizen is not corrupt and will not take advantage for himself 
and his friends and family from his office and thus will get less than he could 
have and thus harm himself. In all these three spheres being just means 
being moral and fair in the common sense and being unjust means being 
immoral and unfair.
 After arguing for how disadvantageous being just is for a good and happy 
life, Thrasymachus moves on to show that unjust behaviors are beneficial for 
happiness. However, this demonstration is mainly valid for doing injustice 
on a large scale,
The unjust man’s situation is the opposite in all of these respects. I am 
speaking of the man I just now spoke of, the one who is able to get the bet-
ter in a big way. Consider him, if you want to judge how much more to his 
private advantage the unjust is than the just. You will learn most easily of 
all if you turn to the most perfect injustice (adikia), which makes the one 
who does injustice most happy (eudaimonestaton), and those who suffer 
it and who would not be willing to do injustice, most wretched. And that 
is tyranny, which by stealth and force takes away what belongs to others, 
both what is sacred and profane, private and public, not bit by bit, but all 
at once. When someone does some part of this injustice and doesn’t get 
away with it, he is punished and endures the greatest reproaches – tem-
ple robbers, kidnappers, housebreakers, defrauders, and thieves are what 
they call those partially unjust men who do such evil deeds. But when 
someone, in addition to the money of the citizens, kidnaps and enslaves 
them too, instead of these shameful names, he gets called happy (eudai-
mones) and blessed (makarioi), not only by the citizens but also by whom-
ever else hears that he has done injustice entire. For it is not because they 
fear doing unjust deeds, but because they fear suffering them, that those 
who blame injustice do so. So, Socrates, injustice, when it comes into be-
ing on a sufficient scale, is mightier, freer, and more masterful than jus-
tice… (Plato, Resp. I,343c–344c, transl. A. Bloom; cf. II,358b–362c).
Similar to Callicles’ view of a good and happy life, Thrasymachus’ analysis of 
happiness culminates in a defense of tyranny and the life of the tyrant. Just 
as for Callicles, for him the life of a tyrant is best. However, to this interpreta-
tion of the passage quoted above one could object that Thrasymachus’ praise 
of pleonexia, injustice, and the happiness of the tyrant is not as unambigu-
ous as that of Callicles and that Thrasymachus might just be reporting the 
prevailing opinion of the masses. However, one of the quoted statements, 
which needs to be attributed to Thrasymachus himself, refutes this objec-
tion. In the conclusion of his argument he explains, “injustice, when it comes 
into being on a sufficient scale, is mightier, freer, and more masterful than 
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justice”.30 This is a value-judgment in favor of pleonexia and injustice.31 Later 
in the dialogue, Thrasymachus also declares that injustice is “good counsel” 
(euboulia) and that unjust people are “prudent” (phronimoi) and “good” (ag-
athoi) persons (Resp. I,348d, transl. A. Bloom). Such favorable assessments of 
unjust persons are another indication that Thrasymachus does not merely 
report the common view of the crowd but shares it. Another argument for 
the claim that Thrasymachus is putting forward “the case for pleonexia” is 
that as a dramatic persona Plato characterizes him “as animal-like, aggres-
sive and incontinent” and thus “as in some respects an embodiment of the 
position he is made to defend”.32
 Section 2 elucidated that Callicles defends psychological and ethical 
egoism, a radical form of hedonism, and pleonexia. Keimpe Algra, for good 
reasons, speaks of “Thrasymachus’ implicit anthropology of pleonexia” and 
suggests that Glaucon is making this anthropology explicit in Book II of Pla-
to’s Republic.33 This is a convincing interpretation because Glaucon, who an-
nounces that he wants to “restore Thrasymachus’ argument”, interprets “the 
desire to get the better (pleonexian)” as “what any nature naturally pursues 
as good” (Resp. II,358b–c, 359c). Thrasymachus’ endorsement of pleonexia 
strongly suggests that he also supports ethical egoism. Whether he grounds 
his ethical egoism on psychological egoism is less clear.34 Finally, despite the 
fact that Thrasymachus does not explicitly make a reference to hedonism, it 
is plausible to assume that his view of a good and happy life is inextricably 
linked to it. It seems natural to presume that the desire to possess a consid-
erable amount of goods such as wealth, power, and recognition is also mo-
30 This conclusion continues with a restatement of what he defended earlier. He continues ex-
plaining, “and, as I have said from the beginning, the just is the advantage of the stronger, and 
the unjust is what is profitable and advantageous for oneself” (Resp. I,344c; transl. A. Bloom).
31 According to Balot, not only Callicles but also Thrasymachus expresses “the ideals of greed”; 
R. K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, p. 235.
32 K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Pleonexia, in: K. A. Algra – 
P. W. van der Horst – D. T. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of 
Ancient Philosophy. Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday (Philosophia Antiqua, 
LXXII), Leiden 1996, pp. 41–59. 
33 Plato, Resp. II,359c4; K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Pleonexia, 
p. 59. Mario Vegetti, who also contributed to the volume in which Algra’s aforementioned pa-
per appeared, takes up the term “antropologia della pleonexia” and includes it in the title of 
his article. However, he does not include a reference to Algra’s article; M. Vegetti, Antropologie 
della pleonexia, p. 196. 
34 Psychological egoism is attributed to Thrasymachus by H. W. B. Joseph, Plato’s Republic: The 
Argument with Thrasymachus, in: id., Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Oxford 1935, 
p. 17. Kerferd concludes that “Thrasymachus was not a psychological egoist”. His argument is 
that the ruled “think they ought to be just against their own interests (cf. 343c6 ff.)”; G. B. Ker-
ferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, p. 562). However, Kerferd’s argument is 
not convincing because to abide by the law is in the best self-interest of the ruled in order to 
avoid punishment (cf. Resp. I,338e, 344b). 
tivated by the desire to use them as a means to obtain a substantial amount 
of pleasure. While Thrasymachus holds the law to be an instrument of those 
who have political power to reach these goals, for Callicles it is a means of the 
crowd to subdue the best and strongest citizens and their striving to have 
an unequal amount of goods.
4. Callicles’ criticism of the rule of law
According to Martin Ostwald’s research, “the absolute validity of nomos, the 
embodiment of the concept of popular sovereignty, remained unquestioned” 
in Athens until “about the mid-fifth century”.35 Regardless of whether Cal-
licles was a real person or just a fictional character, what the Athenian is 
attacking in Plato’s Gorgias is the validity of the democratic nomos of the late 
fifth century. Callicles relates the democratic nomos to questions of power 
and benefit and analyzes its origin and the interests it serves. For him, it is 
the hoi polloi, the crowd, that decides the laws and establishes the moral and 
legal rules to their advantage. Callicles claims that the crowd’s interest is 
to prevent the better and more virtuous citizens from accumulating an un-
equal amount of material goods and political power. While the crowd strives 
for arithmetic equality, the few, motivated by pleonexia, aim at inequality 
and privilege. Callicles’ argument to justify pleonexia and to criticize the 
nomos is based on the opposition of physis and nomos, of nature on the one 
hand, and law, morality, and custom on the other. This was a well-known op-
position in later 5th century Greek thought and several philosophers based 
their arguments on it.36 The common scheme of these arguments is to criti-
cize the nomos by claiming that it can claim no real authority because it is 
neither divine and unchangeable nor part of the order of the cosmos. The no-
mos is just a human and artificial product, which contradicts nature and in 
particular human nature. However, the interpretations of human nature in 
these kinds of arguments differ. While the sophist Antiphon concludes that 
human equality requires social and political equality, for Callicles human in-
35 M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law, p. 250.
36 In all likelihood, the opposition of physis and nomos goes back to Anaxagoras’ student Arche-
laus (DK 60 A 2). Sophocles’ Antigone invokes a natural right to bury her brother Polynices 
despite the ban of king Creon, her uncle. For the opposition of physis and nomos see G. Caser-
tano, Natura e istituzioni umane nelle dottrine dei sofisti, Napoli 1971; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History 
of Greek Philosophy, III, pp. 55–134; F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung 
einer Antithese  im griechischen Denken des 5.  Jahrhunderts, Basel 1965 (19451); G. B. Kerferd, 
The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge 1981, pp. 111–130; M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to 
Sovereignty of Law, pp. 250–273.
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equality demands social and political inequality.37 Callicles’ genealogy of the 
nomos and his argument to justify pleonexia and to criticize the nomos read,
Callicles: Conventions (nomoi), on the other hand, are made, in my opin-
ion, by the weaklings who form the majority of mankind (hoi polloi). They 
establish them and apportion praise and blame with an eye to themselves 
and their own interests (to autois sympheron), and in an endeavour to 
frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand 
they say that taking an excess of things is shameful and wrong, and that 
wrongdoing consists in trying to have more (pleon echein) than others; 
being inferior themselves, they are content, no doubt, if they can stand on 
an equal footing with their betters. That is why by convention an attempt 
to have more than the majority is said to be wrong and shameful, and 
men call it wrongdoing; nature (physis), on the other hand, herself dem-
onstrates, I believe, that it is right (dikaion) that the better man should 
have more than the worse and the stronger than the weaker. The truth 
of this can be seen in a variety of examples, drawn both from the animal 
world and from the complex cities and nations of human beings; right is 
judged to be the superior ruling over the inferior and having the upper 
hand (ton kreittô tou hêttonos archein kai pleon echein). … My conviction is 
that these actions are in accordance with nature (kata physin); indeed, by 
Zeus, I would go so far as to say that they are in accordance with natural 
law (nomos tês physeôs), though not perhaps with the law enacted by us. 
Our way is to take the best and strongest among us from an early age and 
endeavour to mould their character as men tame lions; we subject them 
to a course of charms and spells and enslave them by saying that men 
ought to be equal and that this is fine and right. But I think that if there 
arises a man sufficiently endowed by nature, he will shake off and break 
through and escape from all these trammels; he will tread underfoot our 
texts and spells and incantations and all our unnatural (para physin) laws, 
and by an act of revolt reveal himself our master instead of our slave, in 
the full blaze of the light of natural justice (physeôs dikaion) (Plato, Gorg. 
483b–484b, transl. W. Hamilton – C. Emlyn-Jones; cf. Resp. II,358e–359b; 
Leg. X,890a).
As explained in section 2, Callicles’ genealogy of the nomos has many simi-
larities with Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality. With nomoi, which is trans-
lated here as “conventions”, Callicles seems to refer more to morals and mo-
37 For Antiphon see Papyri Oxyrhynchus (POxy) 1364, DK 87 B 44a; DK 87 B 44b; cf. POxy 3647, 
which was published in 1984; cf. M. Knoll, Antike griechische Philosophie, pp. 159–165.
rality than to laws. However, he also rejects the morality of equality that 
is incorporated and enforced by democratic laws.38 For him, natural right 
and natural justice exist, which can be derived from a natural law. This law, 
which is based on natural inequalities, is a source of law superior to posi-
tive law and allows for criticism of it. According to natural law, it is just 
that the better citizens have more goods and rule over the worse citizens, 
i.e. over the crowd. Similarly, Gorgias states in his Encomium of Helen that 
by nature “the weaker are ruled and directed by the stronger” (DK 82 B 11, 
transl. M. K.). This is another indication that Callicles was Gorgias’ student. In 
the exchange between the Melian commissioners and the Athenian envoys 
which Thucydides reports, he has the latter express similar thoughts, “For of 
the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their 
nature (hypo physeôs anankaias) wherever they have power they always rule” 
(Thucydides, Hist. V,105; transl. C. F. Smith; cf. V,89, 101).39
 The literature usually refers to Callicles’ position as a “natural right of the 
stronger”.40 However, he uses the opposition of the weaker and the stronger 
only when he introduces his views (Gorg. 483b ff.). In the wake of his conver-
sation with Socrates he makes clear that by “the stronger” he really means 
“the better” (cf. section 2). The better citizens who have a right to rule and 
to have more goods than others are the elite of those who possess the vir-
tues “courage” (andreia) and “intelligence” (phronêsis) (Gorg. 489e, 491a–d).41 
What Callicles is actually defending is not a natural right of the stronger 
but a natural right of the better. This is evidence that, in line with his family 
background and his oligarchic connections, Callicles was not only a critic of 
popular sovereignty and democracy, but an aristocratic political thinker.42
38 Cf. R. K. Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, p. 5, and M. Ostwald, From Popular Sover-
eignty to Sovereignty of Law, pp. 248–249.
39 Cf. F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis, p. 167 (footnote 7).
40 A. Graeser, Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik, Platon und Aristoteles, München 
1983; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, p. 101; H. Ottmann, Geschichte des 
politischen Denkens, 1/1, p. 226; 1/2, pp. 15–16; D. Silvermintz, Thrasymachus, in: P. O’Grady (ed.), 
The Sophists. An Introduction, London 2008, p. 95.
41 Ostwald is not aware of this because he wrongly claims, “Callicles has no clear idea in what the 
superiority sanctioned by physis consists”; M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereign-
ty of Law, p. 250. 
42 For the debate on Callicles’ political position see G. B. Kerferd, Plato’s Treatment of Callicles in 
the Gorgias, in: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, New Series, 20, 1974, pp. 48–
52. In line with Kerferd’s view, Mario Untersteiner affirmatively quotes Adolfo Levi’s view that 
Callicles is “presentato come un campione del partito democratico” and refers to Gorg. 481d–e, 
513a–b, 515e; M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti, p. 502, 523. The passages Untersteiner adduces partly 
display Socrates’ irony and do not substantiate Levi’s view, which is also refuted by Callicles’ 
explicit political statements and the information Guthrie gathered about Callicles’ “aristocratic 
and oligarchic connexions”; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, p. 102; cf. M. Os-
twald, From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law, pp. 245–247.
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 Being an aristocratic political thinker, Callicles’ political views are closer 
to Plato’s than is usually assumed. In the Republic, Plato designates the “po-
litical system” (politeia) of his best city – depending on the available amount 
of virtuous rulers – as an aristocracy or a kingship (Resp. IV,445d; cf. VII,520c; 
VIII,544e, 545c).43 This is in line with the literal meaning of the term “aris-
tokratia”, which is “rule of the best” or “rule of the most virtuous”. Like Calli-
cles, Plato does not value an aristocracy based on birth. However, in contrast 
to Plato’s virtuous rulers, those Callicles defends only possess “courage” (an-
dreia) and “intelligence” (phronêsis), not “moderation” (sôphrosynê) and “jus-
tice” (dikaiosynê) (Gorg. 489e, 491a–492c; cf. section 2). A further difference 
to Plato is that, for Callicles, the rule of the one or few best men should not 
aim at the common good, but at their personal advantage. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to locate Callicles’ “ideal constitution” in Plato’s and Aristotle’s scheme 
of six constitutions (Polit. 302c–e; Pol. III,6–7,1279a17–b10). In the context of 
the natural right of the better, Callicles introduces the leonine man who he-
roically frees himself from the unnatural egalitarian and democratic nomoi, 
seizes political power and realizes his pleonexia as a tyrant.44 Such an ideal is 
alien to Plato’s version of aristocratic political thought.
5. Thrasymachus’ argument about justice and law
In all likelihood, Thrasymachus, the orator from Chalkedon, spend a con-
siderable amount of time in Athens in the late fifth century.45 Like Callicles, 
he relates the law to questions of power and benefit and analyzes its origin 
and the interests it serves. For Callicles, in democracies the crowd decides 
the laws and establishes the moral rules to their advantage. In Book I of the 
Republic, Thrasymachus generalizes Callicles’ view by claiming that in every 
political system the ones who have the power and make the laws do not aim 
at the common good but at their personal advantage. Thrasymachus’ argu-
ment about justice and law in Book I of the Republic reads,
Thrasymachus: Don’t you know … that some cities are ruled tyrannically, 
some democratically, and some aristocratically? … In each city, isn’t the 
ruling group master? … And each ruling group sets down laws (nomoi) 
43 For the aristocratic character of the mixed constitution Plato outlines in the Nomoi see M. Knoll, 
Platons Konzeption der Mischverfassung in den Nomoi und ihr aristokratischer Charakter.
44 According to Mario Vegetti, Callicles and his ideal of the leonine man reflect nostalgia toward 
the power of the Athenian oligarchy, which was humiliated by egalitarian democratic law. Simi-
larly, for Vegetti, Callicles’ ideal evokes the shadow of Alcibiades; M. Vegetti, Antropologie della 
pleonexia, p. 198.
45 M. Knoll, Antike griechische Philosophie, pp. 153–154. 
for its own advantage (to autê sympheron); a democracy sets down demo-
cratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic laws; and the others do the same. And 
they declare that what they have set down – their own advantage – is just 
for the ruled, and the man who departs from it they punish as a breaker 
of the law and a doer of unjust deeds. This, best of men, is what I mean: in 
every city the same thing is just, the advantage of the established ruling 
body. It surely is master; so the man who reasons rightly concludes that 
everywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage of the stronger (tou 
kreittonos sympheron) (Plato, Resp. I,338d–339a, transl. A. Bloom; cf. Leg. 
IV,714c–d).
In the literature, we find numerous attempts to reconstruct Thrasymachus’ 
argument about justice and law. According to Maguire, “Thrasymachus says 
three distinct things about the just”.46 In the debate, several scholars distin-
guish between two definitions of justice and disagree about whether these 
are compatible or not: (a) justice is the advantage of the stronger/ruler (Resp. 
I,338c, 339a, 344c); and (b) justice is someone else’s good (Resp. I,343c).47 The 
disagreement about whether these two definitions are compatible is identi-
cal with the dispute about whether Plato’s Thrasymachus defends a coher-
ent and consistent view. The problem linked to this debate, however, is that 
many scholars over-analyze Thrasymachus’ position in the sense that they 
decompose it into several independent statements and definitions. Thrasy-
machus’ statement that “justice is the advantage of the stronger/ruler” is not 
an isolated statement and cannot be understood as a proper definition of 
46 The just is (1) “the advantage of the stronger” (Resp. I,338c); (2) obedience to the laws (Resp. 
I,339b); (3) “someone else’s good” (Resp. I,343c; transl. A. Bloom); J. P. Maguire, Thrasyma-
chos – – – or Plato?, p. 565. 
47 See, also for the literature, K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Ple-
onexia, pp. 55–58. Probably influenced by Algra’s distinction between the two definitions of 
justice mentioned above (a and b), Vegetti distinguishes between “due tesi differenti”. He also 
claims that thesis a and b are not logically connected; M. Vegetti, Trasimaco, in: id. (ed.), Plato-
ne, La Repubblica. Traduzione e commento (Elenchos, I/1), Napoli 1998, pp. 233–256; M. Vegetti, 
Antropologie della pleonexia, pp. 199–201; cf. A. Maffi, Trasimaco fra Platone e Aristotele, in: via-
Borgogna3. il magazine della Casa della Cultura, 10, 2018 (per Mario Vegetti), pp. 68–75. Accord-
ing to Boter’s research, the majority of interpreters “believe that Thrasymachus’ utterances 
are incompatible”. Boter summarizes some readings of such scholars who “over-analyze” (my 
term) Thrasymachus’ statements out of context, which leads to extreme misinterpretations. 
Such scholars argue that “the ruler acts justly by pursuing his own advantage” or that “the 
ruler acts justly by not pursuing his own advantage”; G. J. Boter, Thrasymachus and ΠΛEONEΞIA, 
in: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 39, 1986, p. 262. Among the interpretations that contend that 
Plato’s Thrasymachus defends a coherent view are G. F. Hourani, Thrasymachus’ Definition of 
Justice in Plato’s Republic, in: Phronesis, 7, 1962, pp. 110–120, and G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of 
Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic.
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justice.48 It is rather a provocative catchphrase, which can be synthesized out 
of his views and with which he rhetorically draws attention to his position. 
Similarly, the statement that “justice is another one’s good” does not stand 
alone but is part of a whole proposition which claims that
justice (dikaiosynê) and the just (to dikaion) are really someone else’s 
good (allotrion agathon), the advantage of the man who is stronger (kreit-
tonos) and rules (archontos), and a personal harm to the man who obeys 
and serves. Injustice (adikia) is the opposite, and it rules the truly simple 
and just; and those who are ruled do what is advantageous for him who 
is stronger, and they make him whom they serve happy (eudaimon) but 
themselves not at all (Plato, Resp. I,343c–d; transl. A. Bloom).
Thrasymachus conceives of just behavior, in the sense of law-abiding con-
duct, exclusively as a behavior of the ruled.49 Algra, for good reasons, objects 
to “incompatibilist” interpretations of Thrasymachus’ position that they 
“usually focus exclusively on the definitions and on what may be inferred 
from them (i.e. they study the definition in isolation from their context)”50
 Thrasymachus’ argument about justice and law should be reconstructed 
as follows. According to the first premise of the argument, justice is defined 
as abiding by the laws of the polis and injustice as breaking them. This is 
a common usage and explanation of the term “just” (dikaion).51 This definition 
is similar to Aristotle’s understanding of universal justice in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (V,3,1129b11–1130a13). However, while Aristotle closely 
links legal justice to the ethical virtues, Thrasymachus’ argument seems to 
presuppose a form of legalism or legal positivism.52 According to it, dikaion 
is nomimon. Justice is identical with the positive or established laws of the 
48 The view that Thrasymachus’ statement is not a definition is shared by G. J. Boter, Thrasyma-
chus and ΠΛEONEΞIA, p. 264; G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, 
p. 560; P. P. Nicholson, Unravelling Thrasymachus’ Arguments in The Republic, in: Phronesis, 19, 
1974, p. 211.
49 Cf. K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Pleonexia, p. 58; P. P. Nichol-
son, Unravelling Thrasymachus’ Arguments in The Republic, pp. 214–215.
50 K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Pleonexia, p. 55.
51 Cf. M. Salomon, Der Begriff des Naturrechts bei den Sophisten, in: Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung 
für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abt., 32, 1911, p. 143.
52 For the interpreters who understand Thrasymachus’ position as “legalism”; see G. B. Kerferd, 
The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, pp. 546–547; this is also the view of G. F. Hou-
rani, Thrasymachus’ Definition of Justice in Plato’s Republic, and M. Vegetti, Antropologie della 
pleonexia, p. 199; for Kerferd’s criticism of this view see G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasy-
machus in Plato’s Republic, p. 561, and for his reply to Hournai see G. B. Kerferd, Thrasymachus 
and Justice: A Reply, in: Phronesis, 9, 1964, pp. 12–16. For some evidence in support of Kerferd’s 
views that Thrasymachus was not a legalist see D. J. Hadgopoulos, Thrasymachus and Legalism, 
in: Phronesis, 18, 1973, pp. 204–208. 
polis; no natural law exists. Several interpreters claim that Thrasymachus 
does not recognize any moral obligation or value that transcends the law.53 
However, Thrasymachus uses the terms “just” and “unjust” also according to 
the meaning they have in the common morality (Resp. I,343d–344c). In the 
conventional morality, to behave justly means to honor private contracts, to 
pay taxes and to refrain from corruption and the appropriation of other’s 
possessions. As we have seen, Thrasymachus argues that, in contrast to un-
just behaviors, just ones are not beneficial for a good and happy life (cf. sec-
tion 3).
 The second premise of Thrasymachus’ argument relates justice and law to 
political power. In every political system, the law is given by the members 
of the ruling group (i.e. “the stronger ones”). This is simply a description of 
political reality. The third premise of Thrasymachus’ argument, which relates 
justice and law to the self-interest of the rulers, is more controversial. Ac-
cording to it, all ruling groups or rulers – be it democrats, aristocrats or 
just one tyrant – use their power and legislative authority to pass laws that 
serve their self-interest or advantage. For example, as Plato observed, in all 
political systems the ruling group passes laws that “ensure that it remains 
permanently in power” (Leg. IV,714d, transl. T. J. Saunders). Of course, the 
preservation of political power is merely one specification of the self-interest 
or advantage of the rulers. The ruling group uses political power, legislation 
and legal justice also as a means to gain recognition and to enrich itself. 
This is in line with Callicles and Thrasymachus’ view that human beings are 
driven by pleonexia. The third premise of Thrasymachus’ argument is contro-
versial because it can be objected that ruling groups aim with their legisla-
tion not primarily at increasing their personal advantage, but at maximizing 
the common good of the polis. This is Aristotle’s criterion for distinguish-
ing between the three right political systems – kingship, aristocracy, and 
“polity” (politeia) – on the one hand, and the three wrong ones – tyranny, 
oligarchy, and democracy – on the other (Pol. III,6,1279a17–21, 11,1282b8–13; 
IV,1,1289a10–22).54 Finally, it is important to note that Thrasymachus’ gener-
alization and conviction that “each ruling group sets down laws for its own 
advantage” is a reason that substantiates that he was not only an ethical ego-
ist, but also a psychological egoist.
 According to the conclusion of Thrasymachus’ argument, citizens who are 
just and abide by the laws of their polis realize the interests of the ruling 
53 These interpreters are usually the ones who understand Thrasymachus’ position as “legalism”. 
54 If we ask whether Thrasymachus’ argument about justice and law allows for a political system 
in which the rulers legislate and rule for the common good, one possibility would be a true 
democracy with a high degree of equality (e.g. of property) among the citizens.
Sophistic Criticisms of the Rule of Law  83
84  Manuel Knoll
group. These interests are embodied in the clauses and regulations of the 
laws, which were passed by the rulers in order to promote their self-interest. 
This is why justice is the advantage of the stronger/the rulers or someone 
else’s good. Legal justice is the good of the ruling group and the harm of 
the just and law-abiding citizens. Thrasymachus ascribes just behaviors, in 
the sense of law-abiding conduct, exclusively to the ruled who are forced to 
abide by the laws by the threat of punishment (Resp. I,338e, 344b).55 Thrasy-
machus does not address the question of whether the ruling group is subject 
to the law or above it. However, if the ruling group makes – as he claims – no 
mistakes in setting down what is best for it, and if the ruled are forced to do 
what is best for the rulers, there is no need for them to be above the law (cf. 
Resp. I,340e–341a). This would give them no additional advantage.
Conclusion: The relation of Callicles and Thrasymachus
This article has demonstrated that there are several important similarities 
between Thrasymachus’ and Callicles’ political thought. Both relate the no-
mos to questions of power and benefit and analyze its origin and the inter-
ests it serves. Both defend psychological and ethical egoism and acknowl-
edge pleonexia as a natural human striving. Callicles is clearly a champion 
of hedonism; Thrasymachus in all likelihood shares this position. Both have 
similar ideas about a good and happy life and defend tyranny and the life of 
the tyrant. However, while Callicles’ position is more extreme than Thrasy-
machus’, it is theoretically less profound.56
 According to Kerferd, there is one more crucial similarity between the 
two. He claims that Thrasymachus defends a version of the “theory of Natural 
Right”.57 If this were the appropriate interpretation, Thrasymachus’ position 
would be indeed “practically identical with that of Callicles” who defends 
a natural right of the better.58 However, Kerferd’s claim is not convincing 
and in Book I of the Republic there are no statements that substantiate this 
55 Cf. K. A. Algra, Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus: The Case for Pleonexia, p. 58; P. P. Nichol-
son, Unravelling Thrasymachus’ Arguments in The Republic, pp. 214–215.
56 Cf. M. Vegetti, Antropologie della pleonexia, pp. 197–198. Louis Groake interprets Callicles as 
“a kind of freedom-saint” because, like Gorgias and Polus, he defends “rhetoric as a means to 
individual liberty (eleutheria)”; L. Groake, Callicles, in: P. O’Grady (ed.), The Sophists, pp. 101–110, 
106–107.
57 G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, pp. 548, 550.
58 Ibid., p. 547. With reference to Gorge Grote and Callicles’ supposed “right of the stronger”, 
Guthrie claims that Thrasymachus’ theory is “essentially different from that of Callicles”; 
W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, p. 97. Solomon, who rejects the interpre-
tation that Thrasymachus defends a “right of the stronger” (Recht des Stärkeren), informs us 
that this was a prevailing view in the literature of the 19th century; M. Salomon, Der Begriff des 
Naturrechts bei den Sophisten, p. 144.
interpretation. Kerferd himself acknowledges that Thrasymachus nowhere 
speaks “of natural Justice”.59 Kerferd’s methodical approach is to first list all 
positions that have been attributed to Thrasymachus in the literature. In 
a second step, he tries to determine which is the most appropriate interpre-
tation by eliminating all inadequate ones. However, Kerferd neglects to con-
sider a line of interpretation that goes back to Max Salomon.60 According to 
it, Thrasymachus’ argument about justice and law wants to set up no norm 
and has no normative dimension. For Salomon, Thrasymachus is just a de-
scriptive sociologist who diagnoses what actually happens in politics. This 
interpretation certainly captures an important dimension of Thrasymachus’ 
argument, which can still be applied to analyze central aspects of legislation 
in contemporary democracies. In the parliaments of Western democracies 
there are many MPs who do not mainly represent the will of the people who 
voted for them, but the will of certain lobbies or economic groups such as the 
agricultural lobby, trade unions or employer’s associations. Those MPs use 
their political power to influence legislation with the goal of leveraging legal 
justice to promote the interests of the lobby they belong to.
 Despite the fact that Thrasymachus’ position includes important insights 
that fit squarely within the realm of political sociology, it cannot be reduced 
to it. His praise of pleonexia, injustice, and the happiness of the tyrant im-
plies that he appreciates politicians who have enough power to give laws for 
their personal advantage and happiness. Nevertheless, Kerferd’s view “that 
for Thrasymachus injustice is a moral obligation” is exaggerated because the 
sophist does not explicitly prescribe to anyone that they behave unjustly.61 
Rather, Thrasymachus should be interpreted as a political realist. Like Calli-
cles, he has a sober and realistic view of human nature and politics.62 Human 
beings are motivated by pleonexia. Politics is mainly a struggle for power. 
In this struggle, for Thrasymachus, politicians usually neither respect the 
59 G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, p. 550.
60 M. Salomon, Der Begriff des Naturrechts bei den Sophisten, pp. 142–147. Salomon restates his 
views on Thrasymachus in M. Salomon Shellens, Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des Thrasymachus, in: 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 7, 1953, pp. 481–492. In the recent literature, Salomon’s 
interpretation is defended by Ottmann who does not refer to Salomon; H. Ottmann, Geschichte 
des politischen Denkens, 1/1, p. 226; 1/2, pp. 28–29. Cf. G. B. Kerferd – H. Flashar, Die Sophistik, 
p. 56.
61 Based on his interpretation that Thrasymachus assigns “to injustice the predicates normally 
given to justice as a moral ideal at which people ought to aim”, Kerferd claims that he is no 
ethical nihilist; G. B. Kerferd, The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, p. 561. 
62 In Chapter IV (3), which is headed by “The realists”, Guthrie includes besides Thucydides, Glau-
con, and Adimantus only Thrasymachus. Callices is treated in Chapter IV (4) headed “The up-
holders of physis”; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, pp. 84–134. Untersteiner, 
for good reasons, treats both Callicles and Thrasymachus under the headline “Sofistica e realis-
mo politico”; M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti, pp. 497–504. 
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prevailing morality nor aim at the common good or the happiness of their 
subjects. Rather, through legislation they pursue their self-interest and per-
sonal advantage. A realistic analysis of life shows that people act immorally 
in private and public matters and that only powerful and unjust persons can 
live a truly good and happy life. These are the main lesson of Thrasymachus’ 
descriptive sociology and political realism.63 Considering the fact that a good 
life was the conscious goal of all Greek citizens, this lesson constitutes a huge 
provocation to all moralists and idealists.64 Guthrie argues that Thrasyma-
chus was a “disillusioned moralist”.65 He supports this claim by referring to 
the surviving fragment from Thrasymachus of Chalkedon on justice in which 
he complains that humans make no use of justice, the “greatest of human 
goods” (DK 85 B 8, transl. M. K.). However, whether Plato’s Thrasymachus is 
identical with the historical orator, as Guthrie claims, is not certain.
 While Callicles is an aristocratic political thinker, Thrasymachus is a po-
litical sociologist and political realist. Callicles defends a natural right of 
the better, Thrasymachus seems to be a legal positivist. However, despite 
his legalism Thrasymachus also uses the terms “just” and “unjust” accord-
ing to the meaning they have in the common morality (cf. section 5). Not-
withstanding his criticism that acting morally is detrimental to a good and 
happy life, it is likely that Thrasymachus would acknowledge that a certain 
moral obligation arises from the moral norms of the time. However, for him 
it seems to be more important to be happy than to be moral.
 Like Protagoras, Thrasymachus seems to be not only a legalist but an ethi-
cal relativist and a moral skeptic. For a moral skeptic, no moral facts and no 
moral truths exist in mind-independent ways. For an ethical and legal rela-
tivist, everything which is just and legal is valid only for one polis and relative 
to its particular morality and laws.66 According to the principal clause of 
Protagoras’ philosophy, man is the measure of all things (Tht. 152a). Applied 
to the field of morality, law, and politics, this clause claims that no such thing 
63 The corruption of justice is a topic in Greek political thought that goes back to its beginnings 
with Hesiod, Works and Days, and Solon (Fr. 4 Eunomia). 
64 This is acknowledged by Socrates’ immediate reaction to Thrasymachus’ speech, in which So-
crates asks him rhetorically whether he is “trying to determine a small matter and not a course 
of life on the basis of which each of us would have the most profitable existence?” (Resp. 
I,344d–e, transl. A. Bloom).
65 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, III, p. 97; cf. M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti, p. 501. 
By claiming that Thrasymachus seems to be “ein enttäuschter Moralist”, Ottmann takes up 
Guthrie’s interpretation; H. Ottmann, Geschichte des politischen Denkens, 1/2, p. 28. However, 
Ottmann makes no reference to Guthrie. 
66 Despite Protagoras’ rejection of any universal truths in moral and legal matters, he argues that 
some moral beliefs or views about the good and just are more beneficial or useful than oth-
ers (Tht. 166d–167d, 172a–b, 177d–e). This implies that he rejects an “absolute relativism” that 
claims de gustibus disputandum non est.
as “the just and unjust” has “by nature (physei) any being (ousia) of its own” 
(Tht. 172b, transl. M. J. Levett, rev. M. Burnyeat). Rather, “whatever any com-
munity (polis) decides to be just and unjust, and establishes as such, actually 
is what is just and right for that community and for as long as it remains 
so established” (Tht. 177d, transl. M. J. Levett, rev. M. Burnyeat). This quote 
expresses both Protagoras’ legal positivism and his ethical and legal relativ-
ism, which both presuppose his moral skepticism. For Protagoras, legislation 
always aims at the good and the advantage of the whole community, “A com-
munity always makes such laws as are most useful to it” (Tht. 177d, transl. 
M. J. Levett, rev. M. Burnyeat). For Thrasymachus’ political realism, this is 
an idealist view and an unwarranted generalization that needs to be revised. 
It is neither the whole polis that passes the nomoi nor do the laws always aim 
at the common good. Rather, it is the ruling group that passes the laws to 
promote their self-interest.67 While Protagoras neglects the relation between 
the rulers and the ruled, Thrasymachus’ perspective on the nomos focuses 
on this relationship. The rulers use the nomoi to suppress the ruled. In con-
trast, Callicles’ perspective on the nomos focuses on the relation between the 
individual and the democratic polis. In such a polis the crowd uses the nomoi 
to suppress the most outstanding individuals.
67 Cf. D. Silvermintz, Thrasymachus, p. 96.
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